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Department	of	Society	and	Globalisation,	Roskilde	University,	Roskilde,	Denmark		 This	article	explores	state-civil	society	interactions	in	Mozambique	and	South	Africa	with	a	focus	on	Islamic	groupings,	and	places	the	two	countries	within	an	Indian	Ocean	coastal	continuum	of	links	to	East	Africa,	India,	and	the	Arab	world.	Contrasting	the	histories	of	dominant-party	rule	since	the	transitions	in	1994	to	multiparty-ism	in	Mozambique	and	to	democracy	in	South	Africa,	the	article	discusses	the	development	of	Islamic	organisations	including	both	transnational	Sufi	orders	and	modernist	reform	movements	as	important	components	in	local	civil	societies.	The	article	contrasts	the	spaces	for	accommodation	of	Islamic	groups	that	have	been	created	in	South	Africa	with	the	more	radical	secularism	that	has	been	in	place	in	post-Independence	Mozambique.	Finally,	the	article	discusses	the	effects	of	this	contrast	on	possibilities	for	stability	and	democratic	consolidation	in	the	context	of	the	2014	elections	in	South	Africa	and	Mozambique.		
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		The	present	article	sets	out	to	compare	interactions	between	civil	society	and	the	state	–	and	more	specifically	between	different	forms	of	Islam	and	configurations	of	secularist	government	–	in	Mozambique	and	South	Africa	since	1994.	It	does	so	with	a	point	of	departure	in	recently	conducted	research,	which	has	studied	late	19th	and	20th	century	Sufi	networks	stretching	between	Ilha	de	Moçambique,	Maputo	and	Durban,	and	the	interaction	between	African	and	Indian	Islamic	groupings	in	KwaZulu-Natal	more	specifically.	Mozambique	and	South	Africa	are	in	many	respects	very	different	societies,	and	have	different	modern	political	histories,	with	Mozambique	winning	independence	from	Portugal	in	1974-5,	and	South	African	apartheid	only	coming	to	an	end	in	1994.	At	the	same	time,	a	historical	comparison	of	state-civil	society	interactions	in	the	two																																																									
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countries	appears	meaningful,	especially	since	1994	when	multi-partyism	was	introduced	in	Moçambique,	and	has	not	been	attempted	before.1			 The	article	does	not	claim	to	be	a	systematic	comparative	analysis	of	state-civil	society	relations	in	the	two	countries	since	1994,	but	offers	an	initial	and	tentative	comparison.	The	special	focus	on	the	state	side	are	the	policies	of	secularism	that	have	been	pursued	in	Mozambique	and	South	Africa,	which	both	have	strongly	dominant	ruling	parties	with	a	historical	background	in	national	liberation	movements.	On	the	civil	society	side,	the	article	looks	especially	at	Islamic	organisations	rooted	in	particular	transnational	Sufi	brotherhood	histories,	and	contrasts	these	with	more	scripturalist	or	'fundamentalist'	schools	of	Islam	in	Mozambique	and	South	Africa,	which	have	been	inspired	by	wahaabism	in	the	Arab	world	or	by	deobandism	originating	in	India	and	Pakistan.		The	sources	for	the	discussion	have	limitations,	and	are	to	a	large	extent	drawn	from	the	research	undertaken,	including	personal	communications	and	interviews	conducted	during	periods	of	fieldwork	in	Northern	Mozambique,	Maputo,	and	KwaZulu-Natal.		 The	article	compares	forms	of	state	in	South	Africa	and	Mozambique,	which	can	both	be	characterised	as	dominant-party	states	operating	within	the	frameworks	of	democratic	multi-party	constitutions.		The	dominant-party	character	of	two	states	can	be	illustrated	by	the	series	of	national	assembly	election	results	for	the	two	countries	since	1994	,	when	apartheid	came	to	an	end	in	South	Africa,	and	multi-partyism	was	introduced	in	Mozambique	(see	details	in	Appendix	1).			 As	the	figures	in	Appendix	1	indicate,	developments	in	both	Mozambique	and	South	Africa	initially	moved	steadily	in	the	direction	of	an	increase	in	the	dominance	of	the	dominant	party.	In	Mozambique,	this	reached	a	climax	in	2009,	but	was	reversed	in	the	2014	elections,	when	the	Resistência	Nacional	Moçambicana	(RENAMO)	made	a	comeback	to	challenge	the	dominance	of	the	Frente	de	Libertação	de	Moçambique	(FRELIMO).	In	South	Africa,	by	contrast,	dominance	of	the	African	National	Congress	(ANC)	peaked	in	2004,	and	has	since	been	slowly	decreasing	with	the	Democratic	Alliance	emerging	as	the	most	significant	opposition	party.2	 																																																									1	Thus	Mozambique	is	not	included	in	Roger	Southall's	recent	comparison	of	Southern	African	state,	see	Southall,	Liberation	Movements	in	Power.	2	The	Democratic	Alliance	has	an	electoral	majority	in	the	Western	Cape	Province.	Minority	parties	like	the	Congress	of	the	People	(COPE)	and	Economic	Freedom	Fighters	(EFF)	may	historically	turn	out	to	be	temporary	protest	splinter	parties	from	the	ANC,	rather	than	fully-
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	 Both	South	Africa	and	Mozambique	are	states	that	came	into	existence	in	the	late	20th	century	against	a	background	of	extended	and	violent	liberation	struggles,	but	there	were	a	number	of	important	differences	in	the	ways	the	two	liberation	trajectories	played	themselves	out,	which	can	be	outlined	schematically	as	follows:		•	While	in	South	Africa,	the	armed	struggle	of	the	ANC/United	Democratic	Front	(UDF)	against	apartheid	went	hand-in-hand	with	struggles	through	civil	society	to	make	the	country	ungovernable,	the	armed	struggle	in	Mozambique	of	FRELIMO	against	the	Portuguese	colonial	regime	proceeded	more	through	territorial	conquest	and	the	establishment	of	liberated	zones		•	While	in	South	Africa,	civil	society	mobilisations	were	expected	to	become	foundations	for	alternative	democratic	institutions	of	government	after	liberation,	expectations	in	Mozambique	were	rather	for	a	revolutionary	government	to	emerge	directly	out	of	the	political	structures	created	by	armed	liberation	movement		In	both	South	Africa	and	Mozambique,	civil	society	was	disempowered	at	the	victory	of	the	liberation	movement,	but	in	different	ways:		•	While	in	South	Africa,	the	‘vibrant’	civil	society	of	the	struggle	against	apartheid	was	initially	side-lined	and	over-ruled	by	newly	elected	and	ANC-dominated	state	institutions,	the	situation	in	Mozambique	was	rather	that	civil	society	was	repressed	as	part	of	revolutionary	transformation	and	in	the	context	of	the	armed	struggle	against	RENAMO		In	a	subsequent	phase,	then,	side-lined	or	repressed	civil	society	bodies	and	voices	have	been	re-emerging	to	interact	with	the	state	in	both	South	Africa	and	Mozambique,	but	again	in	different	ways:		•	In	South	Africa,	new	forms	of	post-liberation	civil	society	have	come	to	the	fore	to	autonomously	challenge	the	state	and	represent	a	democratic	counterpoint	to	it.	By																																																																																																																																																																														fledged	alternative	parties	with	a	distinct	agenda.	The	EFF,	however,	has	established	a	spectacular	left-populist	presence,	including	the	disruption	of	Parliamentary	procedure	by	red-uniformed	EFF	MPs.	
	 4	
contrast,	in	Mozambique,	repressed	sections	of	civil	society	have	been	re-asserting	themselves	with	different	outcomes,	with	some	of	them	being	incorporated	into	the	FRELIMO	and	the	‘hegemonic	bloc’	supporting	it,	and	others	struggling	to	exist	with	a	degree	of	autonomy,	resisting	the	pressures	for	domination	by	political	parties.3			These	two	contrasting	trajectories	could	be	discussed	with	reference	to	number	of	different	social	movement	and	civil	society	organisations,	and	have	been	researched	and	written	about	interestingly	as	far	as	traditional	authorities	are	concerned.4	They	are	also	important	in	the	case	of	religious	institutions	like	the	Islamic	movements	and	organisations,	which	provide	the	focus	for	discussion	in	this	article,	seeing	them	as	important	elements	of	civil	society	in	the	two	contexts.			 The	mapping	and	analysing	of	the	two	trajectories	of	state-civil	society	engagement	will	tell	us	something	about	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	the	two	varieties	of	a	dominant-party	state	that	have	come	to	exist	in	South	Africa	and	Mozambique	respectively.	This	will	apply	in	particular	to	the	different	approaches	to	secularism	that	have	characterised	the	development	of	dominant-party	government	policy	in	the	two	countries	since	1994,	and	which	have	provided	alternative	frameworks	for	the	accommodation	of	Muslims	as	citizens	and	for	the	interaction	with	different	varieties	of	Islam.		 On	the	civil	society	side,	the	two	trajectories	provide	an	opportunity	for	discussing	the	role	and	impact	of	different	types	of	Islamic	practices	and	organisation	as	far	as	the	development	of	a	democratic	public	sphere	and	civil	society	dynamics	are	concerned.	In	particular,	the	article	will	look	at	the	ways	in	which	Sufi	brotherhoods	and	Sufi-inspired	Islam	have	provided	an	alternative	to	the	more	'fundamentalist'	forms	of	Islam	that	have	been	given	more	attention	in	recent	discussions	concerning	Islam,	politics	and	democracy	in	Africa.5			
Islam	in	Southern	Africa:	Elements	of	background																																																										3	Political	society	in	the	sense	of	Tocqueville,	rather	than	of	Partha	Chatterjee.	See	Tocqueville,	
Democracy	in	America,	604-609;	cf.	Chatterjee,	The	Politics	of	the	Governed,	38-41.	See	also	Frederiksen,	"Mungiki".	4	See	e.g.		Buur	and	Kyed,	"State	Recognition";	Ntsebeza,	"Traditional	Authorities".	5	Cf.	Ahmed,	Les	conversions	à	l'Islam	fondamentaliste,	33-97.;	"Introduction"	in	Diouf,	Tolerance,	
Democracy	and	Sufis,	1-35.	
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What	populations	and	types	of	Islamic	practice	are	we	talking	about,	when	discussing	Islam	in	Southern	Africa	and	in	South	Africa	and	Mozambique	more	specifically?	In	terms	of	numbers,	there	is	an	important	contrast	between	the	two	countries	with	Muslims	making	out	about	only	1.5%	or	appr.	one	million	people	in	South	Africa	and	nearly	18%	or	appr.	3.6	million	people	in	Mozambique.6	As	argued	by	Abdou	Malique	Simone	in	a	comparison	of	Islamic	movements	in	Sudan	and	South	Africa,	the	contrasting	proportions	may	provide	a	different	background	for	the	ways	in	which	Islamic	voices	join	the	public	sphere,	for	political	articulations	of	Islam,	and	for	negotiations	around	secularism	and	a	shared	democratic	framework	for	religious	and	cultural	rights.7		 The	number	of	Muslims	in	South	Africa	is	growing	rapidly,	however,	and	makes	out	a	substantially	greater	proportion	than	1.5%	today	due	to	the	extensive	immigration	that	has	taken	place	since	1994	from	countries	with	big	Muslim	populations	like	Senegal,	Nigeria,	Somalia,	Malawi	and,	of	course,	Mozambique.		 In	Mozambique,	the	uneven	distribution	of	the	Muslim	population	is	also	significant	with	the	great	majority	of	it	living	in	the	poorest	and	most	isolated	parts	of	country	to	the	north,	where	they	represent	the	majority	population	in	the	Niassa,	Cabo	Delgado	and	Nampula	provinces.	Only	a	minority	of	Mozambican	Muslims	live	in	the	south	of	the	country,	but	important	Islamic	organisations	have	their	bases	in	the	capital	Maputo,	and	the	port	of	Maputo	and	its	mosques	has	historically	given	the	capital	a	special	importance	as	a	transit	hub	for	both	migration	and	religious	transmission	between	the	North	and	South	of	the	country	and	internationally.	The	map	in	Appendix	2	gives	an	idea	of	the	distribution	of	the	Muslim	population	in	Mozambique	based	on	the	1997	census.8			 When	it	comes	to	the	most	important	forms	of	Islamic	practice	in	Southern	Africa,	three	types	have	been	particularly	prominent.	There	is	the	Islam	of	the	Cape	of	Good	Hope	as	it	was	introduced	along	with	the	Dutch	importation	of	slaves	from	the	East	Indies	and	Bengal	from	the	seventeenth	century,	and	subsequently	also	from	the																																																									6	Based	on	the	South	African	census	of	2001	and	the	Mozambican	census	of	2007.	For	Mozambique,	cf.	Cahen,	Waniez	and	Brustlein,		"Pour	un	atlas",	359;	for	South	Africa	cf.	Vahed	and	Jeppie,	"Multiple	Communities".		7	Simone,	"Advantageous	Marginalities",	205-244.	8	The	census,	which	indicated	a	dramatic	rise	in	the	overall	size	of	the	Muslim	population	in	Mozambique,	is	discussed	further	in	Cahen,	Waniez	and	Brustlein,	"Pour	un	Atlas",	see	especially	361-364.	
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Mozambican	Indian	Ocean	coast.9	Secondly	there	are	the	traditions	of	Indian	Islam	brought	along	by	Gujarati	traders,	which	came	to	be	shared	in	South	Africa	also	with	indentured	labourers	from	Bihar	and	Tamil	Nadu	from	the	late	nineteenth	century.10	In	Northern	Mozambique,	trading	networks	with	Goa,	Diu,	and	Daman	have	a	much	longer	history,	going	back	to	the	17th	century,	and	have	left	their	own	marks	on	the	development	of	Islam.11	New	networks	were	added	to	these	in	the	nineteenth	century	through	the	immigration	of	new	Gujarati	trading	families	with	links	also	to	Mauritius	and	to	immigrants	in	East	and	South	Africa.12	Finally,	there	are	more	indigenously	African	traditions	of	Islamic	practice	that	have	been	stretching	down	the	coast	and	been	mediated	by	Swahili	and	other	African	trading	networks,	with	strong	representations	into	the	nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries	along	the	Northern	Mozambique	coast	and	its	islands.13		 The	Indian	Ocean	has	been	a	central	arena	for	the	unfolding	of	all	these	forms	of	religious	practice	and	interaction,	but	in	terms	of	research	not	enough	has	been	made	of	how	Indian	Ocean	dynamics	and	patterns	of	interaction	reached	into	Southern	Africa	and	affected	its	history	and	development.	Relations	between	the	East	Indies	and	the	Cape	have	been	studied,	and	also	relations	of	trade	and	migration	across	the	Indian	Ocean	between	India	and	South	Africa	and	Mozambique.	But	along	the	African	Indian	Ocean	coast	a	rupture	of	networks	has	been	assumed	to	exist	south	of	Beira-Sofala	and	reaching	down	to	Durban	and	Natal	-	often	explained	with	reference	to	the	patterns	and	reach	of	effect	of	the	monsoon	winds.14	Myths	of	the	mfecane	and	the	impact	of	Zulu	state	building	in	the	early	nineteenth	century	have	also	played	a	part	in	explaining	the	idea	of	such	a	disconnection,	though	mfecane	myth	critics	like	Julian	Cobbing	and	Norman	Etherington	have	argued	that	the	violence	and	upheavals	of	the	region	in	the	
																																																								9	Worden,	Slavery	in	Dutch	South	Africa,	97-98;	Datta,	From	Bengal	to	the	Cape,	67-69;	Tayob,	
Islam	in	South	Africa,	34-40;	Worden,	"Indian	Ocean	Slaves	in	Cape	Town".	10	Vahed,	"Constructions	of	Community";	Desai	and	Vahed,	Inside	Indenture,	214-227;	Green,	
Bombay	Islam,	208-234.	11	The	crucial	role	of	both	Hindu	and	Muslim	Indian	traders	in	underwriting	the	slave	trade	from	Mozambique	is	discussed	in	Capela,	O	Tráfico	de	Escravos,	63-66,	and	more	extensively	in	Machado,	Ocean	of	Trade,	208-267.	12	Pereira	Bastos,	"Indian	Transnationalisms";	Khouri	and	Pereira	Leite,	"Indians	of	Eastern	Africa".	13	Bonate,	"Traditions	and	Transition";	Kaarsholm,	"Transnational	Islam";	Bang,	Islamic	Sufi	
Networks,	90-107	14	See	e.g.	Pearson,	The	Indian	Ocean,	19-24.	
	 7	
early	nineteenth	century	were	caused	to	a	significant	extent	by	the	displacements	of	the	Portuguese	Indian	Ocean	slave	trade.15			
Islamic	connections	between	South	Africa	and	Mozambique		My	recent	research	has	aimed	at	by-passing	this	assumed	rupture	and	has	studied	Islamic	movements	and	forms	of	interaction	between	South	Africa	–	most	importantly	what	is	now	KwaZulu-Natal,	but	involving	also	the	Cape	–	and	Mozambique.	These	include	Indian	Islamic	networks	–	stretching	between	South	Asia	and	South	Africa	and	South	Asia	and	Mozambique,	but	also	involving	-	though	to	a	surprisingly	limited	extent	-	linkages	between	Indian	Muslims	in	South	Africa	and	Mozambique.	Only	limited	research	has	been	done	on	the	new	linkages	between	traders	in	Northern	Mozambique	and	India	that	came	about	from	the	late	nineteenth	century,	and	even	less	on	the	relations	between	Indian	families	of	traders	in	Northern	Mozambique	and	in	Natal.	These	families	travelled	and	arrived	in	Africa	at	around	the	same	time,	but	their	paths	divided	as	they	entered	different	linguistic	worlds,	and	to	different	degrees	lost	touch	with	their	Indian	homelands.16				 As	far	as	Indian	Islam	is	concerned,	such	networks	have	been	predominantly	
sunni	with	a	background	in	mostly	the	hanafi	school	of	Islamic	law,	and	have	included	very	different	positions	and	outlooks,	from	more	open-minded	barelwi	and	Sufi	varieties	to	more	scripturalist	deobandi	and	tablighi	jama’at-oriented	ones.	In	Durban	this	has	involved	occasional	clashes	–	as	in	the	1970s	–	between	them	around	the	appropriateness	of	the	visitation	of	graves,	healing,	the	organisation	of	muharram	processions,	the	authority	of	pirs,	mawlid	celebrations,	and	ritual	practices	like	urs	('wedding',	death	anniversary	of	saint).17	With	exceptions	like	the	one	discussed	below,	Indian	Sufism	in	South	Africa	has	usually	been	quite	distinct	from	African	Sufi	Islam.18		 In	Northern	Mozambique	(Nampula,	Nacala,	Ilha	de	Moçambique),	proclaimed	Indian	sunni	organisations	like	CIMO	–	the	Comunidade	Islamica	de	Moçambique	–	have																																																									15	Cobbing,	"The	Mfecane	as	Alibi";	Etherington,	The	Great	Treks,	147-182.	This	revisionism	has	recently	been	challenged	back	in	Jeff	Guy,	Theophilus	Shepstone,	79-81.	On	the	displacements	caused	by	the	slave	trade	in	Mozambique,	see	also	Capela,	O	Tráfico,	273-303.	16	New	research	by	Goolam	Vahed	on	traders	like	Moosa Hajee Cassim	promises	to	make	amends	for	this,	see	Vahed,	"Family,	Gender,	and	Mobility".	17	Vahed,	"Contesting	Orthodoxy".	18	Cf.	Green,	Bombay	Islam,	228;	Kaarsholm	"Transnational	Islam".	
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been	important	and	financially	resourceful	bases	of	support	for	the	African	Sufi	orders.	This	has	been	important	for	their	success	in	standing	against	the	inroads	made	by	
wahaabi	and	other	'purifying'	and	anti-traditionalist	Islamic	reform	movements	since	the	late	1990s.19			 Islamic	networks	thus	also	include	African	ones	that	have	followed	their	own	trajectories	and	dynamics	even	if	they	have	interacted	with	Indian	networks	and	those	of	what	in	Mozambique	are	called	'Moors'	–	referring	literally	to	Arabs	or	Arab-speakers,	but	often	in	Portuguese	usage	implying	mixed-race	or	Indian	Muslims	claiming	Arab	descent.20		Since	1994,	such	African	networks	in	both	South	Africa	and	Mozambique	have	been	powerfully	re-inforced	by	immigration	following	the	end	of	apartheid	influx	control	in	South	Africa,	and	stimulated	by	both	opportunity	migration	and	the	displacements	caused	by	violent	conflict	and	political	meltdown	in	other	African	countries.21	While	some	research	has	been	done	on	Somali	networks	in	South	Africa,	work	on	immigration	networks	in	Mozambique	and	down	the	Indian	Ocean	coastline	is	still	in	short	supply.22			 Like	in	earlier	decades,	African	Islamic	immigrants	have	been	able	to	relate	to	older	networks	as	represented	by	the	Makua	diasporas	created	by	the	eighteenth-	and	nineteenth-century	Indian	Ocean	slave	trade	in	e.g.	Madagascar,	Mauritius,	the	Seychelles,	Somalia	(Jubaland	on	the	Kenyan	border),	in	India,	and	in	South	Africa.23	It	is	remarkable	that	–	in	spite	of	intense	interest	and	monitoring	–	there	has	been	very	little	solid	by	way	of	reporting	a	presence	of	East	African	violent	Islamic	movements	in																																																									19	Bonate,	"Islam	in	Northern	Mozambique";	Declich,	"Transmission	of		Muslim	Practices".	CIMO	follows	on	the	earlier	Comunidade	Mahometana	de	Moçambique	(CMM),	and	has	been	important	for	the	affiliation	of	Indian	Muslims	to	the	national	Islamic	Congress	of	Mozambique.	As	discussed	further	below,	Shia	Ismaili	Islam	has	also	been	significant	historically	in	Mozambique,	see	Pereira	Leite	and	Khouri,	"História	Social	e	Económica	dos	Ismailis"	and	Khouri	and	Pereira	Leite,	eds.	Khojas	Ismaïli.		20	Bonate	explains	'Moor'	as	"a	Portuguese	term	applied	to	Muslims	in	general,	and	to	Indians	or	those	descending	from	Muslim	Indians	and	local	African	women	in	particular,	whom	the	Portuguese	also	often	identified	as	the	descendants	of	the	‘Moors	of	Daman’	(Mouros	de	Damão	)	in	Gujarat,	India".	See	Bonate,	"Traditions	and	Transitions",	73,	note	277.	Cf.	Machado,	Ocean	of	
Trade,	268f.,	on	the	links	between	Muslim	Khoja	and	Ismaili	merchants,	Muscat,	Zanzibar	and	the	Omani	commercial	empire.	21	Landau,	"African	Urbanization".	22	Sadouni,	"Somalis	in	Johannesburg"	and	"Playing	Global".	23	On	the	slave	trade	and	the	dispersion	of	Makuas,	see	Allen,	"The	Constant	Demand";	on	Makua	diasporas	in	Somalia	and	Madagascar,	see	Declich,	"’Gendered	Narratives’"	and	Boyer-Rossol,	"De	Morima	à	Morondava".	
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Mozambique	or	South	Africa.	There	have	been	concerns	about	the	porosity	of	the	North	Mozambican	border	and	the	Querimbas	coastline,	and	after	the	Nairobi	Westgate	attack	in	September	2013	rumours	went	around	that	the	‘White	widow’	of	one	the	July	2007	London	Underground	bombers,	Samantha	Lethwaite,	had	been	involved,	going	in	and	out	on	a	South	African	passport.	But	the	rumours	have	remained	unverified,	and	Al-Shabaab	itself	declared	that	no	women	could	have	been	involved.24	Mozambican	research	on	the	increase	of	immigration	into	Northern	Mozambique	along	the	coast	has	highlighted	the	high	number	of	illegal	immigrants,	who	are	reluctant	to	disclose	their	origins,	but	many	of	whom	are	likely	to	be	Somalis.25			 The	African	Islamic	networks	I	have	studied	most	particularly	in	South	Africa	have	been	small	and	peaceful	ones,	centering	on	a	Makua-speaking	community	in	Durban,	known	as	'Zanzibaris'.	The	community	originated	in	a	group	of	509	liberated	slaves,	whom	the	British	Navy	liberated	from	dhows	intercepted	off	the	coast	of	Northern	Mozambique	near	Ilha	de	Moçambique	and	Angoche.	In	Durban	they	were	placed	under	contract	for	five	years	as	indentured	labourers	alongside	Indian	sugar	workers,	arriving	in	different	batches	between	1873	and	1875,	and	my	research	has	explored	their	uses	of	Islam	to	build	community	and	manoeuvre	politically.	From	the	early	20th	century	groups	likes	the	Zanzibaris	became	bridgeheads	in	South	Africa	for	African	Sufi	networks	and	brotherhoods	like	the	Rifaiyya,	the	Shadhiliyya	and	the	Qadiriyya	and	thus	represented	advance	positions	for	the	expansion	of	very	specific	forms	of	Islamic	practice	and	networking.26		 'Brotherhood'	is	a	misleading	denomination	for	the	Rifaiyya,	Shadhiliyya	and	Qadiriyya	Sufi	orders	since	they	have	given	space	to	women	and	include	women	khalifas	in	their	hierarchies.		In	South	Africa	and	Durban,	the	African	Sufis	interacted	with,	but	mostly	stayed	separate	from	similar	orders	arriving	ifrom	India	and	Bombay,	and	developed	links	to	the	Cape	where	Sufi	orders	with	the	same	names	had	already	established	a	presence	through	a	trajectory	from	Dutch	East	India.	But	the	most	direct	
																																																								24	On	the	’White	widow’	rumours,	see	Wikipedia	-	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samantha_Lewthwaite	(accessed	2	December	2014).	The	rumours	were	recycled	in	the	British	press	without	further	documentation	after	the	Al-Shabaab	Garissa	attack	in	April	2015.	25	The	biggest	group	of	coastal	immigrants	in	Northern	Mozambique,	though,	come	from	Tanzania.	See	Araujo	and	Donado,	"Communidades	Costeiras",	4-6.	Cf.	Borges	Coelho,	"Uneasy	Shores".	26	Kaarsholm,	"Zanzibaris	or	Amakhuwa".	
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linkages	for	African	Sufism	in	Durban	reach	towards	the	north	to	Maputo	and	from	Maputo	further	north	to	Angoche	and	Ilha	de	Moçambique	–	the	great	centre	for	Islamic	Sufi	brotherhoods.	In	Ilha,	they	connect	with	Palma,	the	Comoros	and	Zanzibar,	Lamu,	Brava,	and	the	Arab	world,	as	part	of	African	coastal	and	Swahili	networks	that	are	better	known,	but	which	have	only	been	studied	to	a	limited	degree	at	this	southern	latitude.	27	Against	this	background	and	making	use	of	such	linkages,	the	Makua-speaking	freed	slaves	of	Durban	were	able	to	re-invent	themselves	as	Zanzibaris	or	‘Swahilis’.	In	this,	they	followed	a	pattern	of	'Swahilisation'	that	is	well-known	elsewhere	along	the	coast,	but	unique	inasmuch	as	the	Durban	Zanzibaris	held	on	to	their	Makua	language	–	stigmatized	elsewhere	as	a	language	of	slaves.	It	is	this	combination	of	Sufi	Islam	and	the	Makua	language	as	markers	of	community	identity,	which	made	it	possible	for	the	Zanzibaris	subsequently	to	re-assert	themselves	after	the	end	of	apartheid	as	Amakhuwa	and	as	Africans	with	a	dual	national	belonging	in	both	South	Africa	and	Mozambique.28			
The	usefulness	of	Makua	and	Sufi	Islamic	networks			These	late	19th	and	20th	century	networks	served	predominantly	to	facilitate	trade,	migration,	education	and	religious	and	cultural	interaction	–	providing	the	machinery	of	exchange	within	what	Nile	Green	has	called	a	'religious	economy'	or	an	'economy	of	enchantment'.29	But	perhaps	most	importantly	their	function	was	to	establish	a	degree	of	transnational	autonomy	and	freedom	of	movement	vis-à-vis	state	regulation.	This	was	demonstrated	by	the	success	of	invented	identities	like	that	of	Zanzibaris,	but	also	in	the	achievements	of	evading	and	circumventing	systems	of	population	movement	control	during	the	period	of	apartheid	influx	control	in	South	Africa	as	well	as	colonial	restrictions	on	movement	in	Mozambique.	The	Zanzibari	settlement	on	the	Bluff	in	Durban	thus	became	a	popular	entry	point	for	Muslim	migrants	from	Mozambique	and	Malawi	in	particular,	looking	for	job	opportunities	or	seeking	an	escape	from	persecution		 At	the	same	time,	the	Mozambique	connection	supplied	the	Zanzibaris	with	important	linkages	of	education	and	support	as	well	as	cultural	resources,	e.	g.	in	the																																																									27	Bonate,	"Traditions	and	Transition",	30-72;	Bang,	Islamic	Sufi	Networks,	22-46.	28	Kaarsholm,	"Diasporas	or	Transnational	Citizens?".	29	Green,	Bombay	Islam,	18.	
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field	of	cultural	expertise	and	healing,	basing	themselves	on	Mozambican	cultural	resources.	These	included	both	herbal	and	Islamic	medicines	and	hiriz	-	short	texts	from	the	Qur'an	that	can	be	dissolved	and	swallowed	with	an	effect	of	healing.	Hiriz	has	also	been	used	to	fortify	the	body	before	undergoing	the	piercing	rituals	of	ratiep	that	are	sometimes	part	of	Sufi	celebrations	of	mawlid,	the	Prophet's	birthday,	in	both	Mozambqiue	and	South	Africa.	They	also	included	the	daira	and	duffu	drums	used	in	
mawlid	celebrations.30		 Ritual	and	ritual	expertise	and	power	were	thus	prominent	in	transmissions,	and	provided	a	link	between	the	Durban	Zanzibaris	and	not	only	Northern	Mozambique,	but	also	in	fact	Zanzibar,	which	together	with	the	Comoros	islands,	were	central	nodes	in	the	networks	through	which	the	Rifaiyya,	Qadiriyya	and	Shadhiliyya	Sufi	networks	expanded	towards	Mozambique	and	South	Africa	from	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century.31	In	this	way	South	African	ratiep	–	which	has	been	studied	more	as	'fakir	dancing'	or	'khalifa'	in	Cape	Town,	where	it	had	arrived	first	through	older	versions	of	Sufi	networks	from	Dutch	East	Asia	–	in	Durban	continued	and	re-invented	Islamic	brotherhood	rituals	like	the	mawlid	nakira,	the	mawlid	yahum,	the	mawlid	al	habshi	known	from	Zanzibar	and	Lamu.	A	characteristic	of	this	is	the	chanting	and	sitting-down	dancing	of	male	groups,	performing	dhikr,	which	in	Mozambique	became	a	famous	instance	of	folk	culture	in	the	more	modern	version	by	female	cultural	groups	known	as	
tufo	and	secularised	under	early	FRELIMO	governance.32		 The	port	city	of	Maputo	-	the	former	Lourenço	Marques	-	has	been	an	important	hub	inbetween	South	Africa	and	the	Sufi	centres	in	Ilha	and	Northern	Mozambique,	and	on	the	Durban	Bluff,	the	Zanzibaris	lived	just	above	the	harbour,	where	many	of	them	worked.	They	were	great	fisheaters	and	seafarers,	and	many	Zanzibari/Makua	culinary	and	cultural	specialities	are	linked	to	the	sea	and	sea	travel.	Muslim	sailors	from	Mozambique	would	make	their	way	to	the	Bluff,	and	as	dockers,	ship	repair	workers,	and	Zanzibaris	would	visit	Maputo,	and	move	in	and	out	of	the	city	both	in	colonial	times,	during	apartheid	and	after.	In	Maputo,	the	Qadiriyya	and	Shadhiliyya	mosques	in	the	Makua-speaking	townships	of	Mafalala	and	Minkajuine	have	been	especially	central	
																																																								30	Interviews	with	members	of	the	Amakhuwa	Research	Committee,	Bayview,	Durban,	January	2014.	An	extended	account	can	be	found	in	Kaarsholm,	“Zanzibaris	or	Amakhuwa?”.	31	See	also	Pouwels,	Horn	and	Crescent,	191-208;	Bang,	Sufis	and	Scholars	of	the	Sea,	126-152.		32	Nuotio,	"The	Dance	that	is	not	Danced";	Arnfred,	"Tufo	Dancing".	
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to	Sufi	network	exchanges,	and	extended	Durban-Mozambican	family	networks	have	been	influential	within	them,	and	continue	to	control	the	Shadhiliyya	mosque.33		 Some	network	activities	–	both	political,	economic	and	cultural	–	are	not	so	easy	to	get	to	know	about,	but	some	are	known	thanks	to	the	monitoring	of	the	state.	This	applies	e.g.	to	the	travels	of	the	famous	Ilha	de	Moçambique	Qadiriyya	shehe,	Sayyid	ba	Hasan,	who	travelled	extensively	and	also	covered	the	trail	between	Ilha	and	Durban,	where	he	established	a	family.	We	know	about	this	from	the	research	of	Liazzat	Bonate	into	the	surveillance	records	of	the	Portuguese	colonial	authorities,	who	monitored	his	movements	and	tried	to	understand	his	networks.34	Sayyid	ba	Hasan	died	and	was	buried	in	the	central	Islamic	cemetery	in	Maputo	in	1963	–	his	grave	there	is	still	visited	by	people	who	believe	in	its	healing	and	miracle-working	capacities,	and	who	sing	songs	about	the	good	deeds	of	ba	Hasan.	When	I	visited	the	grave	in	January	2014	together	with	ba	Hasan's	great-grandson,	Said	Habib	–	an	imam	at	the	Polana	mosque	in	central	Maputo	and	an	advisor	to	the	Mozambican	President	on	Islamic	affairs,	trained	in	at	the	All	Africa	University	in	Khartoum	–	he	carefully	cleaned	the	grave	of	the	grass	which	had	overgrown	it	and	of	coins	that	had	been	left	on	it,	giving	a	practical	demonstration	of	the	shift	from	traditionalist	Sufism	to	modernist	reformism.35			
Islam	and	state-civil	society	interaction	in	South	Africa	and	Mozambique		If	we	try	to	compare	the	inclusion	of	Islamic	groupings	in	South	Africa	and	Mozambique	in	state-civil	society	interaction,	this	–	in	South	Africa	after	1994	–	has	been	extensive.	This	may	have	to	do	with	the	small	minority	status	of	the	Muslim	population	as	argued	by	Simone	(see	above),	but	it	has	other	reasons	as	well.	One	is	the	the	post-apartheid	South	African	Constitution,	which	includes	a	comprehensive	Bill	of	Rights,	incorporating	cultural	rights,	which	–	as	supervised	by	the	South	African	Constitutional	Court	–	has	offered	a	framework	for	the	negotiation	of	multiculturalism,	and	has	to	some	degree	
																																																								33	Interviews	with	mosque	officials,	Maputo,	January	2014,	and	with	members	of	the	Amakhuwa	Research	Committee,	Bayview,	Durban,	January	2014.	34	Surveilance	records	and	government	reports	are	discussed	in	Bonate,	"Traditions	and	Transitions",	13,	127-135.	35	Interview	with	Said	Habib,	Maputo,	22	January	2014;	on	the	songs	commemorating	Sayyid	ba	Hasan's	miracle	working,	interview	with	Shehe	Omar	Bishehe	Abdallah,	Nampula,	27	January	2011.	
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made	sense	of	the	slogan	of	the	'Rainbow	Nation'.36	Another	reason	lies	with	the	diversity	of	the	South	African	Muslim	population,	which	has	given	rise	to	a	public	space	for	debate	between	groups,	views	and	positions.37	Further,	the	African	National	Congress	has	had	prominent	Muslims	among	its	elite	members,	and	influential	ANC	ministers	like	Kader	Asmal	and	the	late	Dullah	Omar	have	been	Muslims.	As	Minister	of	Transport,	Omar	was	responsible	for	the	opening	of	the	new	cross-border	coastal	road	connecting	Durban	with	Maputo	through	Kosi	Bay	and	Ponta	Douro,	which	–	besides	furthering	tourism	–	was	a	gesture	towards	the	accelerated	unfolding	of	networks.				 Diversity	and	inclusiveness	have	their	historical	roots	in	the	different	trajectories	through	which	South	African	Muslim	communities	have	developed	–	with	very	different	characteristics	and	periodization	in	e.g.	the	Cape	and	Natal	–	and	in	the	ways	in	different	groups	of	Muslims	related	to	apartheid	and	to	the	anti-apartheid	liberations	struggle.	Some	Muslim	groups	were	politically	quietist,	or	collaborated	with	apartheid	multiculturalism	through	the	Tricameral	Parliament	-	including	some	of	the	more	conservative	groups	of	Indian	Muslims	in	Natal,	often	linked	since	the	1960s	to	Tabligh	Jamaat	reformationism.			 On	the	other	hand,	from	the	1970s,	youth-based	organisations	like	the	Muslim	Youth	Movement	(MYM),	Qiblah	and	the	Call	of	Islam	(CoI),	which	centered	on	the	Cape,	but	also	had	support	in	Natal	and	on	the	Rand,	would	be	much	more	politically	inspired,	and	would	link	up	with	radical	left	movements	in	different	ways.	While	MYM	was	important	in	supporting	the	recruitment	of	Black	Africans	and	in	confronting	the	authority	of	conservative	imams,	Qiblah	and	the	CoI	developed	more	outward-looking	links	with	nationalist	liberation	movements	-	Qiblah	with	the	Pan-African	Congress	(PAC),	the	CoI	with	the	UDF,	which	in	the	1980s	came	to	stand	in	for	the	illegal	ANC.38	This	contributed	to	both	diversity	and	liberation	struggle	respectability	and	credentials,	which	were	important	for	post-apartheid	recognition	and	inclusion.	It	also	helped	to	make	it	possible	to	defuse	the	challenge	from	the	violent,	Muslim-based	PAGAD	movement	–	People	Against	Gangsterism	and	Drugs	–	which	emerged	in	the	Cape	as	an	
																																																								36	In	its	inclusiveness	the	South	African	constitution	is	comparable	to	the	Canadian	constitution,	and	-	as	a	more	recent	example	for	discussion	-	the	Kenyan	constitution	of	2013.	Inclusiveness	of	rights	can	of	course	present	problems	of	contradiction	as	well	as	possibilities	for	compromise	and	mediation	as	will	be	discussed	further	below.		37	Vahed	and	Jeppie,	"Multiple	Communities";	Tayob,	"Muslim	Publics".	38	Tayob,	Islamic	Resurgence,	148-156.	
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anti-state	moralist	vigilante	movement	in	the	mid-1990s,	but	never	came	to	represent	a	South	African	'terrorist	threat’.39		 Another	example	of	interaction	is	the	discussion	around	Muslim	Personal	Law,	where	the	South	African	Constitution	has	provided	a	workable	framework	for	consultations.	This	has	resulted	in	practical	propositions	for	ways	in	which	the	different	sets	of	entitlements	within	the	Bill	of	Right	can	be	reconciled,	and	working	out	possibilities	for	recognising	Muslim	cultural	and	religious	rights	through	legislation	on	inheritance,	marriage	and	women's	rights,	while	respecting	also	other	fundamental	Constitutional	rights.	The	codification	of	the	revised	framework	for	Muslim	Personal	Law	has	so	far,	however,	been	blocked	by	opposition	from	conservative	groupings.	Their	counter-argument	is	the	paradoxical	one	that	the	South	African	Constitution	is	in	itself	unconstitutional,	since	it	does	not	recognize	that	different	cultural	communities	–	like	Muslims	–	must	each	be	allowed	to	set	their	own	legal	frameworks,	rules	and	institutions.40			 In	general	terms,	Islam	in	South	Africa	after	1994	has	been	able	to	establish	both	its	own	frameworks	of	an	Islamic	public	sphere,	and	at	the	same	time	to	find	accommodation	within	the	setting	of	a	more	comprehensive	national	public	space,	whose	moderate,	compromise-oriented	secularism	has	allowed	Muslims	and	Islamic	organizations	to	be	important	parts	of	post-apartheid	South	African	civil	society.	This	again	has	allowed	Islamic	organisations	to	be	prominent	in	the	reception	of	immigrants,	and	in	the	reconciliation	of	conflict	and	violence	relating	to	xenophobia.	Mosques	in	central	Durban,	for	example,	have	been	important	centres	and	rallying	points	for	both	West	African	Muslim	immigrants,	and	for	the	Somali	traders	who	have	helped	to	resurrect	the	ailing	businesses	of	Durban's	traditional	central	business	district.41		 Diversity	has	also	meant	that	–	with	Durban	as	a	good	example	–	South	Africa	has	provided	an	arena	for	energetic	debate	between	different	Islamic	views	and	those	of	the	Christian	evangelical	and	Pentecostal	groupings	that	have	also	been	gaining	ground.	For	a	long	time	Ahmed	Deedat's	Islamic	Propagation	Centre	International	(IPCI)	was	at	the	centre	of	this.42	
																																																								39	Vahed,	"Islam	in	the	Public	Sphere	of	South	Africa".	40	Moosa,	"Muslim	Family	Law	in	South	Africa",	342.	41	Misgun,	"Foreign	Migrants".	42	Vahed,	Ahmed	Deedat,	81-90.	
	 15	
	 In	the	context	of	my	own	recent	research,	an	example	of	post-1994	state	recognition	of	Muslim	citizens'	claims	is	the	land	restitution	case,	which	in	2004	gave	the	Zanzibari	community	the	land	back	at	Kings	Rest	in	Durban	from	which	they	were	forcefully	removed	under	the	Group	Areas	Act	in	1962.	The	implementation	of	land	restitution	is	still	on-going	and	involves	complicated	issues	around	the	delimitation	of	community	membership,	different	interests	concerning	restitution	(as	land	or	cash	compensation),	and		violent	protests	from	the	white	residents	on	the	Bluff	against	being	joined	by	new	Black	African	neighbours.	It	also	involves	interesting	debates	concerning	how	exactly	a	historical	situation	that	was	discontinued	more	than	fifty	years	ago	can	be	brought	back	to	life.	This	is	of	course	not	physically	or	literally	possible,	but	calls	for	a	representation	of	the	history	of	Islam	and	migration	in	Durban	which	involves	heated	and	complicated	debates	around	the	rights	to	represent,	as	has	been	the	case	also	around	Muslim	history	in	Cape	Town,	and	the	District	Six,	Bo-Kaap,	and	Simonstown	commemoration	projects.43		 Such	debates	and	a	competing	–	and	lost	–	land	claim	by	the	resourceful	Durban	Juma	Masjid	Trust	have	led	to	a	rift	in	old	alliances	between	African	Sufis	and	Indian	Sunnis	–	exactly	the	kind	of	alliances	which	have	also	helped	to	sustain	the	African	Sufi	orders	in	Northern	Mozambique.	When	I	visited	Bayview	in	October	2014,	builders	commissioned	by	the	Juma	Masjid	Trust,	who	are	the	owners	of	the	land,	on	which	the	Rahmaniya	Mosque	is	situated,	were	busy	fencing	in	the	land	to	protect	the	property	against	squatters.	Meanwhile,	Zanzibaris	have	intensified	their	links	with	Mozambique	and	their	orientation	towards	Makua	language	and	cultural	rights.	After	a	period	of	relative	decline,	ratiep	performances	and	celebrations	of	mawlid	have	been	brought	back	to	life	with	extensive	backing,	as	exemplified	by	the	three-day	mawlid	celebrations	that	was	held	in	Bayview	in	April	2013.		 As	far	as	state-civil	society	relations	are	concerned,	Mozambique	has	been	going	through	a	different	history.	Important	in	this	history	has	been	the	continued	marginalisation	of	Northern	Mozambique,	which	goes	back	to	the	fragility	of	Portuguese	colonial	rule,	which	did	not	establish	an	effective	presence	in	the	Islamic	North	until	the	1920s.44	This	gave	extensive	power	to	sub-state	institutions	like	chiefs	and	shehes	and	alliances	between	them	-	developments	which	left	an	important	imprint	on	the																																																									43	Kaarsholm,	"Zanzibaris	or	Amakhuwa?".	44	Newitt,	A	History	of	Mozambique,	398-401.	Cf.	Hafkin,	"Trade,	Society,	and	Politics",	359ff.	
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character	of	the	Sufi	networks	that	have	been	the	most	important	Islamic	institutions	in	the	North.45	In	this	field	again,	the	research	of	Liazzat	Bonate	has	been	path-breaking.	By	contrast	to	these	more	indigenous	authorities,	Portuguese	rule	was	based	on	Christianity	as	the	basis	for	citizenship	and	inclusion	and	on	radical	measures	of	segregation	–	not	so	much	between	races,	as	between	those	were	'Portugalised',	'civilisado'	or	'nao-indigena',	and	those	who	belonged	to	the	'indigenato'.46		 Only	very	belatedly	in	the	years	before	Independence	did	the	Portuguese	try	to	ally	themselves	with	Muslims	in	the	North	-	considered	at	this	late	stage	to	represent	a	benevolent	form	of	'islão	negro'	as	against	the	radicalism	of	wahaabis	–	but	without	much	success:	Muslims	of	the	North	would	rather	support	the	nationalist	movements	and	guerrillas	crossing	in	from	Tanzania.47	Nonetheless,	suspicions	of	collaboration	came	to	be	used	as	legitimation	for	the	suppression	of	Muslim	culture	and	authorities,	which	went	along	with	FRELIMO's	policy	of	radical	secularism	and	'anti-obscurantism'	that	was	adopted	in	1977.48	Though	this	policy	of	'hard'	secularism	was	softened	somewhat	from	the	1980s,	it	remained	a	framework	of	constitutional	rights,	outlook	and	policy	that	was	very	different	from	the	South	African	situation	and	made	for	very	different	dynamics	of	interaction	between	the	state	and	civil	society.	On	the	civil	society	side,	Joana	Pereira	Leite	has	highlighted	the	dramatic	group	exodus	from	Mozambique	between	1973	and	1976	of	Shia	Ismaili	Muslims	in	the	context	of	the	war	of	liberation,	independence,	and	following	the	Ugandan	expulsion	of	Indians	of	1972.49		 At	the	same	time,	post-colonial	FRELIMO	government	continued	the	traditions	of		fragility,	neglect	and	underdevelopment	established	by	colonialism	in	the	North,	and	this	weakness	of	the	state	together	with	its	anti-Islamic	policies	led	parts	of	the	North	to	support	RENAMO	in	the	civil	war	that	raged	between	the	early	1980s	and	1992.	In	this	context,	the	dominant	party	revised	its	policies	and	encouraged	the	formation	of	Islamic	associations	that	could	be	negotiated	with,	like	CISLAMO	–	the	Islamic	Council	of	
																																																								45	Bonate,	"Islam	in	Northern	Mozambique".	46	Newitt,	A	History	of	Mozambique,	441f.	Cf.	Cabrita,	Mozambique:	The	Tortuous	Road,	120-123.	47	Bonate,	"Muslims	of	Northern	Mozambique".	Cf.	Alpers,	"Islam	in	the	Service	of	Colonialism?".	48	Bonate,	"Muslim	Religious	Leadership",	643.	49	Pereira	Leite,	Khouri	and	Mascarenhas,	"Les	departs	des	Ismailis."	Cf.	Melo,	"A	Diáspora	Ismaelita".	
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Mozambique,	formed	in	1981	-	and	the	Islamic	Congress	of	Mozambique,	formed	in	1983.50				 CISLAMO	was	dominated	by	tablighis	and	deobandi	groups	and	what	was	–	according	to	Bonate	-	originally	radically	uncompromising	groups	of	wahaabis,	led	by	Aboobacar	Mangira	and	linked	to	the	Arab	world	through	well-resourced	Islamic	NGOs	like	the	Africa	Muslim	Agency.51	By	contrast,	the	Congress	had	its	power	base	in	the	North	and	among	the	Sufi	orders.	This	led	to	heated	and	sometimes	violent	confrontations,	especially	as	FRELIMO	initially	favoured	CISLAMO	with	its	base	in	the	South	and	Maputo	and	–	not	least	–	because	of	the	diplomatic	and	business	connections	that	could	be	pursued	with	Arab	countries	and	the	Middle	East	through	CISLAMO.	Later	–	especially	since	the	appointment	of	the	Aminuddin	Muhammad	-	the	Director	of	the	Muslim	Hamza	College	in	Matola	–	as	National	Secretary	of	CISLAMO,	the	opposition	would	become	framed	in	less	antagonistic	terms,	with	Sufi	reformers	like	Said	Habib	mentioned	above	joining	in	to	the	debate	as	to	whether	the	Qadiriyya	and	Shadhiliyya	orders	are	'traditionalist'	and	'outdated'.52				 From	1994,	however,	when	multi-partyism	was	introduced,	FRELIMO	changed	its	policy	again,	and	tried	to	win	support	in	the	North	against	the	power	of	RENAMO	through	collaboration	with	Sufi	leaders	of	Northern	Mozambique.	This	included	alliances	with	the	leader	of	the	Qadiriyya	Bagdade	in	Ilha	de	Mocambique,	shehe	Abdulrazaq	Jamu,	as	well	as	with	the	leader	of	the	Shadhiliyya	Yashrutiyya	in	Ilha,	shehe	Sayyid	Amurri	bin	Gimba.	Another	prominent	Northerner,	Dr	Jose	Ibraimo		a	lawyer	from	Angoche	with	strong	links	to	the	Shadhiliyya,	was	included	in	the	FRELIMO	government	between	1994	and	2004	as	Minister	of	Justice.53		 FRELIMO	has	been	sceptical,	however,	concerning	this	alliance,	and	has	suspected	Muslims	of	following	their	own	anti-secularist	agendas,	and	supporting	RENAMO.	There	has	not	been	any	compromise	agreement	around	Muslim	Personal	or	Family	Law	as	such,	and	the	Constitution	of	1990	and	later	amendments	in	1996,	1998	
																																																								50	Morier-Genoud,	"Muslims	and	Political	Power";	Bonate,	"Muslim	Religious	Leadership",	2008;	Bonate,	"Islam	in	Northern	Mozambique".	51	An	interesting	alternative	wahaabi	perspective	is	provided	in	Kadara	Swaleh’s	article	on	his	father’s	missionising	in	Mozambique.	See	Swaleh,	“Islamic	Proselytising”,	414-418.	52	Interview	with	Aminuddin	Mohammad,	Matola,	8	February	2011;	interview	with	Said	Habib,	Maputo,	22	January	2014.	53	Morier-Genoud,	"Muslims	and	Political	Power	in	Mozambique";	interviews	with	Jose	Abudo,	Maputo,	7	February	2011	and	21	January	2014.	
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and	2004	–	though	allowing	space	for	decentralisation	and	some	recognition	of	traditional	institutions	–	does	not	provide	a	framework	for	the	negotiation	and	regulation	of	cultural	and	religious	rights.	The	Family	Law	Act	of	2004,	which	applies	to	all	groups	of	citizens,	outlaws	polygamy,	but	does	not	provide	rules	or	institution	to	enforce	or	negotiate	this,	while	–	contradictorily	–	inheritance	laws	have	been	passed	that	entitle	all	wives	of	a	husband	to	inherit	equally.54		 FRELIMO's	romance	with	the	Sufi	orders	in	the	North	faded	out	after	2004,	when	the	dominant	party	finally	succeeded	in	winning	a	majority	also	in	this	part	of	the	country,	and	the	Muslim	ministers,	including	Abudo,	were	not	re-appointed,	though	FRELIMO	continued	a	policy	of	collaboration	with	'secular	Muslims'.55		In	consequence	of	this,	Northern	Muslims	made	a	turn	towards	civil	society,	creating	educational	foundations	and	re-inventing	brotherhood	structures	as	community	development	organisations.	A	new	generation	of	Qadiriyya	and	Shadhiliyya	leaders	–	like	Hafiz	Jamu,	the	son	of	Abdulrazzaque	Jamu,	of	the	Qadiriyya	Bagdade,	and	Saide	bin	Gimba	Amur,	the	son	of	Saide	Amurri	bin	Gimba	of	the	Shadhiliyya	Yashrutiyya	–	enlisted	for	development	studies	training	at	the	Catholic	University	of	Mozambique	campus	in	Nampula,	and	put	this	to	practical	use	in	various	projects	in	Ilha	de	Moçambique	and	Nampula	Province.	As	we	saw,	a	third	member	of	the	same	generation	–	Said	Habib,	the	great-grandson	of	Sayyid	ba	Hasan	and	the	son	of	the	leader	of	the	Qadiriyya	Sadat,	
shehe	Sayyid	Habib	Bakr	–	went	to	the	All	Africa	University	in	Sudan	instead,	and	returned	-	not	to	the	North,	but	to	Maputo	–	a	modernist	reformer.56		 In	the	most	recent	period,	Sufi	Islam	in	the	South,	including	Maputo,	seems	to	have	been	on	the	defensive	vis-à-vis	the	reformist	and	wahaabi	impact,	with	declining	support	for	the	central	Shadhiliyya	and	Qadiriyya	mosques	in	Mafalala,	but	the	contestation	is	still	undecided,	and	Durban	Sufis	have	attempted	to	bring	in	support.	There	may	have	been	a	decline	in	mawlid	celebrations	in	Southern	Mozambique,	though	in	2008,	Jose	Abudo	of	the	Islamic	Congress	of	Mozambique	and	Margarita	Talapa	of	the	Mozambican	Muslim	Women's	Association	took	the	lead	in	organising	a	huge	ziyara	festival	in	Maputo.	This	became	a	rally	not	only	of	Sufi	order	members,	but	also	of																																																									54	Buur	and	Kyed,	"State	Recognition";	CEDAW,	"Shadow	Report".	55	Morier-Genoud,	"Muslims	and	Political	Power",	264f.	56	On	Abdulrazzaque	Jamu,		Sayyid	Amurri	bin	Gimba,	Sayyid	Habib	Bakr	and	the	leadership	of	the	major	Qadiriyya	and	Shadhiliyya	groupings	from	the	1960s	after	the	death	of	Sayyid	ba	Hasan,	see	Bonate,	"Traditions	and	Transitions",	102-107.	
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Makua	speakers	from	many	parts,	including	Durban,	and	a	manifestation	of	strength	on	behalf	of	Northern	Mozambique	which	was	attended	by	President	Guebuza.		 At	the	same	time,	celebrations	of	mawlid	in	the	North	appear	to	have	been	increasing	and	finding	growing	support	in	both	Ilha,	Nampula,	Nacala	and	Angoche.	On	19	January	2014,	I	attended	the	mawlid	celebrations	in	Ilha	de	Moçambique	organised	by	the	Sufi	orders	with	the	financial	and	logistical	support	of	CIMO	-	the	Sunni	Comunidade	Islamica	de	Moçambique.	This	was	a	major	display	of	strength	and	of	reclaiming	public	space,	starting	with	a	march	around	the	perimeters	of	the	whole	island	from	the	early	morning.			 It	was	also	the	occasion	for	celebrating	the	victory	in	the	municipal	elections	in	Ilha	de	Moçambique	in	November	2013	of	the	young	Shadhiliyya	shehe	Saide	bin	Gimba	Amur	as	mayor	of	Ilha,	and	in	his	speech	at	the	mawlid	the	mayor	acknowledged	that	his	victory	was	due	to	the	strength	of	the	Sufi	orders	of	people's	respect	for	them.	The	victory	seems	to	have	been	the	outcome	of	something	of	a	local	youth	rebellion	within	FRELIMO	as	well	as	of	lack	of	respect	for	the	opposing	Movimento	Democrático	de	Moçambique	(MDM)	candidate	(as	was	noted	above	RENAMO	boycotted	the	municipal	elections).57			 In	the	15	October	2014	Presidential	and	National	Assembly	elections,	RENAMO	did	contest	and	made	a	remarkable	comeback,	with	Afonso	Dhlakama	winning	36.61	%	of	votes	in	the	Presidential	election	against	Filipe	Nyusi's	57.03	%,	and	taking	32.46	%	of	the	votes	in	the	National	Assembly	elections	against	FRELIMO's	55.93	and	MDM's	8,35	%.58	The	October	2014	elections	thus	reduced	the	majority	of	the	dominant	FRELIMO	party	significantly.	This	trend	was	clearly	expressed	in	the	National	Assembly	voting	in	Nampula	Province	also,	where	RENAMO	and	FRELIMO	each	won	22	seats	and	MDM	three	seats.	In	the	elections	for	Provincial	Assembly	seats	in	Nampula,	there	were	variations,	however,	with	an	overall	result	of	FRELIMO	taking	47	seats	against	RENAMO's	45	and	only	one	for	MDM.	In	Nampula	City,	RENAMO	won	the	elections,	taking	seven	seats	against	FRELIMO's	five	and	MDM's	one.	In	Ilha	de	Moçambique,	
																																																								57	In	the	municipal	elections	held	in	November	2013	(and	boycotted	by	RENAMO),	FRELIMO	won	50	out	of	53	municipalities,	but	the	opposition	party	MDM	won	in	Nampula,	Quelimane	and	Beira,	and	on	a	national	scale	won	30%		of	the	number	of	municipal	assembly	seats.	See	
Mozambique	Political	Process	Bulletin,	no.	54,	part	one,	23	December	2013:	1.	 	58	For	the	Presidential	election	results,	see	2014	National	Elections:	Mozambique	Political	Process	
Bulletin,	No.	NE-74,	30	October	2014.	For	the	National	Assembly	results,	see	Appendix	1	below.	
	 20	
however	–	where	the	Shadhiliyya	shehe	Saide	Amur	had	been	elected	Mayor	in	November	2013	–	FRELIMO	won	the	seat,	running	against	the	general	trend.59		 The	renewed	alliance	between	FRELIMO	and	the	local	Sufi	leadership	in	Ilha	therefore	appeared	to	have	paid	off.	Meanwhile	at	the	national	level,	FRELIMO	for	the	elections	had	consolidated	their	links	with	CISLAMO	–	the	Islamic	Council	of	Mozambique	–	and	the	anti-Sufi	reformationists	based	in	the	South	of	the	country,	by	having	the	General	Secretary	of	CISLAMO,	Abdul	Carimo,	appointed	Chairman	of	the	National	Elections	Commission	(CNE).60	This	helped	to	drive	a	wedge	between	RENAMO	and	some	potential	Muslim	supporters,	and	became	significant	later	as	the	CNE	rejected	RENAMO	complaints	over	election	irregularities,	making	Afonso	Dhlakama	refer	to	its	Chairman,	Abdul	Carimo,	contemptuously	as	'the	Muslim'.61		 In	this	way,	the	battle	for	state	control	of	the	North	of	Mozambique	remained	of	central	importance,	as	did	the	battle	for	the	Muslim	vote	–	and	for	the	incorporation	of	the	different	Muslim	constituencies	of	Mozambique	into	a	political	society	dominated	by	either	FRELIMO	or	RENAMO.		
Conclusion		What	the	above	discussion	has	demonstrated,	I	hope,	is	that	in	a	comparison	between	the	two	dominant-party	regimes	of	South	Africa	and	Mozambique,	South	Africa	comes	out	as	the	stronger	alternative	because	of	its	different	framework	and	modus	for	interaction	with	civil	society,	as	exemplified	by	Islamic	groupings	and	institutions.	This	may	qualify	some	of	the	reservations	that	have	recently	been	directed	at	the	South	African	state	for	suppressing	or	even	violently	attacking	its	civil	society	counterparts.	Instances	of	this	have	included	the	Marikana	shootings	of	trade	union	activists,	violent	interventions	against	service	delivery	protests	or	the	uprisings	of	slum	dwellers,	but	also	interferences	with	media	to	limit	reports	on	self-serving	representatives	of	the	'party	state'	that	has	grown	out	of	the	ANC	as	a	liberation	movement.62	In	spite	of																																																									59	Mozambique	Political	Process	Bulletin,	No.	56,	28	November	2014,	14	and	16.	60	"Mozambique:	Abdul	Carimo	Appointed	CNE	Chairperson",	All	Africa,	27	May	2013	–	http://allafrica.com/stories/201305280275.html	(accessed	on	1	December	2014).	61	2014	National	Elections:	Mozambique	Political	Process	Bulletin,	No.	NE-76,	9	November	2014,	2.	62	Southall,	Liberation	Movements.	On	Marikana,	see	Kaarsholm,	"Africa	Globalized?";	Breckenridge,	"Marikana	and	the	Limits	of	Biopolitics".	
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confrontations	and	mal-functions,	a	framework	and	sets	of	regulation	have	been	evolving	that	protects	the	autonomy	of	civil	society	vis-à-vis	the	state.	Together	with	the	gradual	decrease	in	the	dominance	of	the	dominant	party,	this	has	served	to	strengthen	and	stabilise	the	South	African	post-apartheid	state	rather	than	weaken	it.		 In	Mozambique,	by	contrast,	the	multipartyist,	post-1994	state	has	continued	to	be	weak	–	partly	because	of	its	lack	of	outreach	and	of	recognition	of	its	legitimacy	in	the	North	of	the	country.	If	we	use	the	state's	interaction	with	Islamic	institutions	after	1994	as	example,	relations	between	state	and	civil	society	have	been	characterised	by	invasion,	co-optation,	or	marginalisation	rather	than	by	dialogue,	and	the	development	of	a	stable	democratic	framework	and	sets	of	rules.	This	has	weakened	the	dominant-party	state,	and	has	helped	bring	about	a	situation	where	–	with	the	decline	in	FRELIMO	dominance	–	the	alternative	seems	to	the	emergence	of	another	dominant	party,	maybe	even	backed	by	armed	and	violent	mobilisation.	Instead	of	signalling	an	outlook	of	peace	and	pluralism,	the	challenge	represented	by	RENAMO	to	FRELIMO	in	the	North	appears	to	threaten	renewed	civil	war	and	destabilisation.	The	absence	of	a	consolidation	of	democracy	is	indicated	by	the	overruling	of	civil	society	by	political	society,	and	the	turning	into	political	pawns	of	civil	society	institutions	like	the	Islamic	movements	and	organisations.		 In	the	face	of	this,	the	Sufi	networks	and	the	transnational	linkages	discussed	between	Makua	speakers	in	South	Africa	and	Mozambique	may	be	seen	to	point	to	new	opportunities	for	civil	society	organisation	that	present	an	alternative	both	to	nationalist	mobilisations	with	a	fixed	focus	on	the	state,	and	to	multinational	enterprises	of	ideology	and	culture	imposed	from	above.	Rather	than	being	outmoded	and	traditionalist,	such	networks	of	multiple	belonging	and	mediated	through	language	and	Islamic	ritual	may	present	a	way	forward	to	movements	of	everyday	globalisation	from	below,	through	which	both	new	notions	of	citizenships	and	transnational	democratic	potentials	may	be	developed.			
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APPENDIX	1		National	assembly	election	results	between	1994	and	2014:63		1994:	Mozambique:		 	 	 	 	 	 FRELIMO:		 44.33%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 RENAMO:		 37.78%		South	Africa:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ANC:		 	 62.65%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 NP:	 	 20.39%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 IFP:	 	 10.54%		1999:	Mozambique:		 	 	 	 	 	 FRELIMO:	 48.54%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 RENAMO:	 38.81%		South	Africa:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ANC:	 	 66.35%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 DP:	 	 9.56%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 IFP:	 	 8.58%		2004:	Mozambique:		 	 	 	 	 	 FRELIMO:	 63.03%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 RENAMO:	 29.73%	
																																																								63	Election	results	drawn	from:	South	Africa	1994,	1999,	2004,	2009	and	2014:	Manuel	Álvarez-Rivera,	Election	Resources	on	the	Internet:	General	Elections	in	the	Republic	of	South	Africa	-	http://electionresources.org/za/	(accessed	30	November	2014);	Mozambique	1994,	199,	2004	and	2009:	African	Elections	Database,	Elections	in	Mozambique	-		http://africanelections.tripod.com/mz.html		(accessed	30	November	2014);	Mozambique	2014:	Mozambique	News	Agency,	AIM	Report	494,	31	October	2014	-	http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim494.html	(accessed	30	November	2014).	
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	South	Africa:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ANC:	 	 69.69%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 DA:	 	 12.37%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 IFP:	 	 6.97%		2009:	Mozambique:		 	 	 	 	 	 FRELIMO:	 74.66%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 RENAMO:	 17.68%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 MDM:	 	 3.93%		South	Africa:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ANC:	 	 65.9%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 DA:		 	 16.66%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 COPE:	 	 7.42%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 IFP:	 	 4.55%		2014:	Mozambique:		 	 	 	 	 	 FRELIMO:	 55.93%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 RENAMO:	 32.46%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 MDM:	 	 8.35%		South	Africa:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ANC:	 	 62.15%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 DA:	 	 22.23%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 EFF:	 	 6.35%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 IFP:	 	 2.40%			
APPENDIX	2		Map	of	Muslim	population	in	Mozambique	in	1997:64	
																																																								64	Map	drawn	from:	Michel	Cahen,	Philippe	Waniez	and	Violette	Brustlein,	"Pour	un	atlas	social	et	cultural	de	Mozambique",	Lusotopie,	1,	2002:	342.		
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